
The Global Ecosocialist Network (GEN) and Marxmail.world co-hosted a 鈥溾 forum on September 10 to discuss the strategies and tactics needed to move beyond capitalism.
The invited speakers were Rehad Desai, a climate justice activist and documentary filmmaker from South Africa; Howie Hawkins, a long-time activist in the labour and environmental movements in the US; Simon Pirani, British researcher and lecturer focused on energy transition and technologies; and Sabrina Fernandes, Brazilian sociologist and political economist.
With no global 鈥渂lueprint鈥 for building class-conscious and internationalist movements, the activists presented their thoughts on the strategy and tactics needed to challenge the power of fossil-fuel capitalism. The discussion was wide-ranging and included ecosocialist degrowth, the upcoming Conference of the Parties in Brazil and the need to continue strategising.
Desai emphasised the devastating impact of global heating on Africa and the necessity of a deep, just transition. Hawkins discussed the ecosocialist Green New Deal (GND) in the US, which emphasises public ownership and planning. Pirani discussed the importance of a socialist approach to technologies, advocating for public ownership and decentralised renewable energy and Fernandes highlighted the threats of green colonialism and the need to de-commodify carbon.
Desai, who is also a member of GEN鈥檚 steering committee, prefaced his talk by reminding us that capitalism has brought 鈥渦nspeakable horrors鈥 over its five centuries of existence, particularly through its expansion via colonisation.
He recommended Sven Lindqvist鈥檚 book, and the 2021 of the same name from acclaimed filmmaker Raoul Peck for their accounts of this.
Desai explored attitudes on the impacts of climate breakdown in the Global North (particularly the US), where, based on a recent survey, assumptions are made about a so-called superior capacity to survive because of technological advances, or being able to 鈥渓ive off grid鈥.
However, he said, 鈥渘o one can escape societal breakdown, not even the rich鈥. Populations in the Global North are as much at risk due to the atomisation of society, reliance on complex supply chains and the inability of urban-based populations to readily adapt.
The Global North鈥檚 alternative to the climate threat is to arm itself and bunker down, Desai said. Ecosocialists鈥 alternative, on the other hand, 鈥渟eeks to avoid climate catastrophe鈥 and to present a vision 鈥渨hich centres humanity and nature at the front, centre and back of all its considerations鈥. He said this vision would entail 鈥渂uild[ing] equality through fighting for reforms and that protects nature in all its forms, as a foundation for our human existence.
鈥淚t鈥檚 a view that embraces ancient and spiritual knowledge, and sees humans as guardians of the natural environment.
鈥淲e argue against those that see 鈥 individual life choices, individual carbon footprints as a solution, and point to the need for systemic change that can take us away from the abyss that we all now face.鈥
Green New Deal
Hawkins described the US Green Party鈥檚 Ecosocialist GND as a 鈥渢ransitional program鈥, or 鈥渞oadmap鈥 to an ecosocialist society. This is 鈥渂ecause its immediate demands, such as clean energy, universal health care, a job guarantee of public jobs for the unemployed, are incompatible with the profit interests of the capitalist rulers鈥.
Hawkins identified three 鈥渃amps鈥 in the GND debate in the US: liberal/Keynesian; neoliberal; and ecosocialist. He then traced the GND鈥檚 development in the US, dating back to 2000, and its later influence on campaigns by Greens in Europe and Britain. He said there had been a struggle to 鈥渄elink鈥 the GND from the historical 鈥淣ew Deal鈥 associated with the US Democratic Party.
鈥淎n ecosocialist GND is a program to get to 100% clean energy, and then zero and then negative carbon emissions rapidly on the order of a decade,鈥 Hawkins said. 鈥淚t includes an economic Bill of Rights for guaranteeing universal access to a living wage, job and income above poverty, affordable housing, comprehensive health care, lifelong, free public education (from childcare through college) and a secure retirement by raising Social Security benefits.鈥
Hawkins explained that another of the GND鈥檚 key components is a Clean Energy Program, which 鈥渆mphasises public enterprise and planning to coordinate the complex energy transition across different economic sectors鈥.
Hawkins raised the prospect of a global GND, envisioning the US as a 鈥渨orld humanitarian superpower鈥 (in the words of former Green Party presidential candidate Ralph Nader) providing economic and technical assistance to other countries.
He said progressive Democratic candidates, such as Alexandria Ocasio Cortez (AOC), had included the GND idea in her own campaign, inspiring young climate activists to take on the Democratic establishment 鈥 although 鈥渄iluting the content鈥 in the process.
This culminated in a non-binding resolution for a GND, proposed to Congress by AOC and Senator Ed Markey (Massachusetts), which left out a ban on fracking, building new fossil fuel infrastructure, phasing out nuclear power, deep cuts to military spending and a 2030 deadline of reaching 100% clean energy and zero carbon emissions (replaced with the demand for 鈥渘et zero鈥).
Hawkins said the Democratic establishment worked to prevent the GND resolution being tabled in Congress and, when the Republicans put it to a vote in the Senate, the Democrats either abstained or voted against it.
Popular support for a GND still sits at 60鈥70%, and candidates in the 2020 Democratic primaries were forced to take a position. Even then-Vice Presidential nominee Kamala Harris adopted the slogan, but without committing to public spending and serious policy changes. Bernie Sanders was the only Democratic candidate at the time to offer an alternative to the party鈥檚 neoliberal approach.
Public ownership
Pirani talked up the need for a socialist approach to addressing the climate crisis, especially countering 鈥渘arratives that portray the move away from fossil fuels as a simple switch of technologies, without any deep-going social change鈥.
Public ownership is not enough, he said, adding, it 鈥渘eeds to be combined with a liberatory vision of the future, and of the ways that technologies, liberated from capital, can be remade鈥.
鈥淪ocialists stand not only for common, social or public forms of ownership of the means of production, but also for changing what those means of production do. We are for the development of technologies that meet human needs, and [we are] against technologies that enhance the power of capital.鈥
Pirani also criticised those advocating various 鈥渢echnofixes鈥, such as carbon capture and storage and geoengineering and their promotion of 鈥渘et zero鈥. He critiqued 鈥渟upposed low-carbon fuels, such as hydrogen鈥, arguing that this is 鈥渁 grand technological deception鈥 because 鈥減roducing hydrogen from fossil fuels simply perpetuates the use of those fuels. And hydrogen produced without fossil fuels has a very heavy energy cost.鈥
Pirani proposed several starting points for his argument:
1. Do things differently, such as more public transport compared to private vehicles, cutting waste in construction and industry and reducing throughputs of needless junk;
2. Change technological systems, such as insulating homes properly and getting off gas heating; and
3. Produce energy without burning fossil fuels.
Pirani argued that given nuclear power鈥檚 links to military uses, renewables 鈥渟hould be preferred鈥.
He also discussed the potential for decentralised renewable power generation, demand-side reduction and forms of common ownership.
Bottom鈥搖p transition needed
Fernandes discussed the contradictions around the energy transition in Latin America, particularly in Brazil.
Describing the devastating bushfires and flooding in the south of Brazil in May, displacing about 2 million people, she said that while the Luiz In谩cio 鈥淟ula鈥 da Silva government鈥檚 response to the disaster was better than the previous right-wing Jair Bolsonaro government鈥檚 would have been, the disasters still exposed the limitations of 鈥渃entre-left class conciliation and class negotiation鈥.
This means that conversations around environmentalism, the energy transition and the broader ecological transition are appropriated by a 鈥渕arket-commodity approach鈥.
Fernandes is part of the , formed in 2020, to 鈥渟upport a bottom-up ecosocial transition for Latin America鈥. Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Bolivia are involved.
The organisation鈥檚 platform promotes a critical understanding of the 鈥渄ecarbonisation consensus鈥 process occurring across Latin America.
Fernandes also pointed to an article by and , who argue in the International Sociological Association鈥檚 journal 聽that the aims of the decarbonisation consensus 鈥渄o not include the deconcentration of the energy system, care for nature, or global climate justice, but other motivations such as attracting new financial incentives, reducing the energy dependence of some countries, expanding market niches or improving the image of companies鈥.
Furthermore, Bringel and Svampa argue that 鈥淒ecarbonisation is not seen as part of a broader process of changing the metabolic profile of society (its patterns of production, consumption, circulation of goods, and waste generation) but as an end in itself鈥 and 鈥渢he ideology of indefinite economic growth is being maintained鈥.
Fernandes said the conversation around reducing fossil fuels is also influenced by 鈥渙ld-style left developmentalist thinking鈥 that 鈥渢he best way to secure sovereignty is by exploiting oil ourselves鈥.
This is a huge obstacle for ecosocialists trying to combat the argument that, if Brazil doesn鈥檛 extract the oil, 鈥渇oreign companies will come and grab it for themselves and it will be privat[ised]鈥, or that royalties 鈥渃an be used to finance the transition鈥.
鈥淚 don鈥檛 think they even believe it themselves,鈥 Fernandes said, 鈥渂ecause there are actually no plans in place to [do] 鈥 these two [things].
鈥淚f you鈥檙e for taking nuclear down or you鈥檙e for taking fossil fuels down, as more renewables are coming online, you need to have a plan for that; you need to have coordination.
鈥淩ight now [the government] doesn鈥檛 have 鈥 a plan for coordination 鈥 just easily digestible messaging for the media, like: 鈥榃e will advance and we will be one of the last to stop drilling for oil because we need it, because we鈥檙e so behind, so we need it in order to finance the transition鈥.鈥
Regarding the energy transition in Brazil, Fernandes said Lula recently announced its 鈥渂ig energy transition plan鈥, with much ceremony, but that a lot of it is 鈥渇ocused on building infrastructure鈥.
The private sector is very interested in that, she said, and 鈥渋s looking at the state as a way to de-risk its own investments鈥.
She said while the state 鈥渘eeds to abide by its commitments鈥 on emissions reductions, starting to finance a transition 鈥 directly through subsidies or tax breaks, loans and financing schemes 鈥 allows private corporations to 鈥渦se the state 鈥 to grab these resources and expand [their] portfolios鈥.
鈥淭hat鈥檚 why a lot of the fossil fuel companies are becoming energy companies,鈥 said Fernandes. This is accompanied by state-financed industry rebranding to make companies鈥 energy mix of oil, wind and green hydrogen look 鈥渃lean and natural鈥.
鈥淲e should be arguing for de-risking from a different perspective. We should be putting de-risking and de-commodification together,鈥 she said.
Fernandes said the big problem in any transition is that the 鈥渃ommodity consensus鈥 is embedded in it. 鈥淚t鈥檚 very easy to make the argument that we are 鈥榓dvancing鈥 鈥 in transition terms 鈥 because everything has been reduced to decarbonisation.
鈥淲e have 鈥榗arbon tunnel vision鈥: everything gets reduced to the unit of carbon, [that] carbon is what we should be removing or capturing from the atmosphere and [this leads to] geoengineering, techno fixes promoted by the fossil fuel industries.
鈥淥r carbon is the way that we measure products that we鈥檙e going to be selling; it鈥檚 a way to get agribusiness to agree to some of the carbon laws; and it is the way of getting everybody involved so that we don鈥檛 have losses.
鈥淲hen we鈥檙e talking about the environmental impacts of 鈥 for example 鈥 pollution, we are privatising profits and they are externalising all of the losses. So, the losses are coming onto the state and onto the people.鈥
Reflecting on the May floods, Fernandes said Brazil was not prepared for the number of people who lost their houses and livelihoods. There was no 鈥渘ational adaptation plan鈥, she said, the government instead pushing the idea that helping people only involved financing them for loss and damage.
Reparations
She said there is need for reparations, but that to do that properly requires that 鈥渨e identify those who are responsible for the problem. Even that is not just a matter of 鈥減unishing them for their crimes鈥.
鈥淚f we understand that we are going through a phase of ecological collapse 鈥 then the laws that we have to identify something as a crime and to punish people 鈥 they become quite minimal.
She said 鈥済lobal ecocide鈥 requires that the debates around the impact of human society under capitalism cannot just be slotted into a specific legal framework.
鈥淲henever we have an approach [regarding] reparations that is so dependent on pressing charges and relationship-specific body of laws 鈥 we鈥檙e always dealing with the 鈥榓fter-effect鈥 problem.
鈥淚f we have an approach that鈥檚 more tied to decommodifying, we go to go back to the big issue around property. It is not enough for us to own the oil if we鈥檙e just going to do what Shell does or we鈥檙e going to partner up with Shell and BP. State-owned companies, in many places, are responsible for ecocide."
Fernandes said the problem with reducing the transition to energy is that 鈥渋t tends to isolate us from the effects and various impacts of our actions鈥. For instance, it is important to ensure 鈥渁 transition in one place鈥 is not done 鈥渁t the expense of the livelihoods of people somewhere else鈥. The way we mine essential minerals, used by renewables, really does matter, she said, pointing to the use of the term 鈥淪acrifice Zone鈥.
Social movements in Latin America use the term particularly in relation to extractivism. 鈥淚n Chile, communities started demanding to be recognised as sacrifice zones, to the point that this became an official [classification].
鈥淏ut now we're moving to the stage of 鈥楪reen Sacrifice Zones鈥, because we鈥檙e not coordinating throughout the supply chain.鈥
When we鈥檙e asking to transition the jobs of workers in the automobile industry in the US, or in Germany, Fernandes said it should not just mean producing electric vehicles.
鈥淚t means moving them into the public transportation sector and also giving them opportunities to get out [through] training for other areas. It means going after the curriculum. Because how can we talk about transitioning the jobs of people in one sector if we鈥檙e still graduating people into the same sector in the same way?
鈥淚f we move people [around] and change the sector itself, then we鈥檙e not going to have the same burden that were having right now: going to the Congo, Chile, Argentina and other parts of the world, looking for lithium, cobalt, copper and many other types of strategic minerals to the transition."
Fernandes said things are now at the stage 鈥渨here extractivism is moving to green extractivism鈥 and the 鈥渃ooperation鈥 between the Global North and Global South is still falling into what she describes as 鈥済reen colonialism鈥.
She cited Germany or France partnering with organisations in the Global South around 鈥済reen hydrogen hubs鈥, but that, in the end, is about the Global North 鈥済rabbing territory鈥 to produce renewable energy ostensibly for domestic consumption, but that can be exported elsewhere.
Any talk or plan for the transition has to include the justice element, Fernandes said, otherwise, it becomes 鈥渧ery easy for the commodity form and private property interests to determine the direction鈥.