һƷ̽��

The moment the AUKUS security pact came into being, its true intention was clear.

The military agreement between Washington, London and Canberra, announced in September 2021, would project United States power in the Indo-Pacific with one purpose in mind: deterring China.

Conservative and Labor governments have fallen for the US bribe of the nuclear-powered Virginia Class SSN-774 submarines and the promise of a bespoke AUKUS-designed nuclear-powered counterpart.

These submarines may never make their way to the Australian navy: Australia is historically bad when it comes to constructing submarines and the US is under no obligation to furnish the boats.

The latter was made clear in the , which directs the US president to certify to the relevant congressional committees and leadership, no later than 270 days prior to the transfer of vessels, that this “will not degrade the United States underseas capabilities”; is consistent with the country’s foreign policy and national security interests; and furthers the AUKUS partnership.

Furthering the partnership would involve “sufficient submarine production and maintenance investments” to meet undersea capabilities; the provision by Australia of “appropriate funds and support for the additional capacity required to meet the requirements”; and Canberra’s “capability to host and fully operate the vessels authorized to be transferred”.

Eldridge Colby, Donald Trump’s chief appointee for reviewing the AUKUS pact,  in his March confirmation hearing as undersecretary of defence policy, that a poor production rate of submarines would place “our servicemen and women […] in a weaker position”.

����� that “AUKUS is only going to lead to more submarines collectively in 10, 15, 20 years, which is way beyond the window of maximum danger, which is really this decade.”

The unrealised SSN program is also distorting Australia’s defence budget. The decade to 2033–34 features a total projected budget of $330 billion. The SSN budget of $53–63 billion puts nuclear-powered submarines at 16.1% to 19.1% more than relevant land and air domains.

An April  by the conservative Strategic Analysis Australia think tank did not shy away from these implications, saying, “It’s hard to grasp how unusual this situation is.” It added that “since key elements of the maritime domain (SSNs and the two frigate programs) will still be in acquisition well into the 2040s”, it is possible that the defence department “itself doesn’t grasp the situation that it’s gotten into”.

Despite this Australia is being asked to do more. Defense wonks in the White House, Pentagon and Congress are wondering what Australia would do with the naval hardware. Could Australia be relied on to deploy them in a US-led war against China? Should the boats be placed under US naval command?

Now, another think tank, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), is urging Australia to clarify how it would deploy the Virginia boats.

����, authored by a former senior AUKUS advisor during the Joe Biden administration, Abraham Denmark, and Charles Edel, senior advisor and CSIS Australia chair, are proposing that Australia offers “a more concrete commitment” to the US, while being sensitive to its own sovereignty. This, they say, can be achieved through “a robust contingency planning process that incorporates Australian SSNs”.

This would involve US and Australian military strategists planning to “undergo a comprehensive process of strategizing and organizing military operations to achieve specific objectives”.

Such a process would provide “concrete reassurances that submarines sold to Australia would not disappear if and when needed”.

It might also preserve Australian sovereignty in both developing the plan and determining its implementation during a crisis.

The authors also suggest that the  of the AUKUS agreement, involving the development of advanced capabilities, the sharing of technology and increasing the interoperability between the armed forces of the three countries, be more sharply defined.

“AUKUS nations should consider focusing on three capability areas: autonomy, long-range strike, and integrated air defense.” This would supposedly “increase deterrence in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific”.

In terms of examples, Trump’s Golden Dome anti-missile shield is touted as an “opportunity for Pillar II in integrated air defense”.

Australia was already at work with its US counterparts in developing missile defence systems that could complement the initiative. Developing improved and integrated anti-missile defences was even more urgent, given the “greatly expanding rotational presence of US military forces in Australia”.

This nonsense is delusional.

When it comes to sovereignty, Australia’s security apparatus, along with most major party MPs, sees no trouble with deferring responsibility to the US imperium.

[Binoy Kampmark lectures at RMIT University.]