Venezuela: Regime change is 鈥榤ade in the USA鈥

February 15, 2019
Issue 
Mobilization in defense of President Nicol谩s Maduro. Caracas, January 23.

Since its outset, the Donald Trump administration has ratcheted up pressure on Venezuela and radicalised its positions, writes Steve Ellner.

In the process, the Venezuelan opposition has become more associated with 鈥 and dependent on 鈥 Washington and its allies. An example is the opposition protests on February 4. The actions were timed to coincide with the European Union鈥檚 鈥溾 stating that they would recognise the shadow government of Juan Guaid贸 if President Nicol谩s Maduro did not call elections within a week.

The opposition鈥檚 most radical sectors, which include Guaid贸's Voluntad Popular party (VP) along with former presidential candidate Mar铆a Corina Machado, have always had close ties with the United States. Guaid贸, as well as VP head Leopoldo L贸pez and the VP鈥檚 Carlos Vecchio, who is the shadow government鈥檚 Charg茅 d鈥橝ffaires in Washington, were educated in prestigious US universities. This is not uncommon among Latin American economic and political elites.

The ties between the opposition and international actors are strong: Vecchio called the campaign to unseat Maduro 鈥渁n 鈥. Guaid贸, referring to opposition-called protests, said 鈥渢oday, February 2, we are going to meet again in the streets to show our gratitude to the support that the European Parliament has given us鈥.

In doing so, Guaid贸 explicitly connected the authority of outside countries to his own assumption of leadership.

Unfavourable outcome

The outcome of Washington鈥檚 actions is bound to be unfavorable in several ways, regardless of whether or not they achieve regime change. Most important, a government headed by Guaid贸 will be perceived both by Venezuelans and international observers as 鈥渕ade in USA鈥. The opposition鈥檚 association with foreign powers has already allowed the Maduro leadership to rein in discontented Chavistas.

Furthermore, Venezuelans will perceive any sign of economic recovery under a Guaid贸 government as tied to aid, if not handouts, from Washington. Designed to discredit Maduro鈥檚 socialist government, such assistance will undoubtedly be used to further US economic and political interests.

In fact, US National Security Advisor John Bolton has indicated that he is already calling on oil companies to opt for investments in Venezuela once Maduro is overthrown. He : 鈥淲e鈥檙e in conversation with major American companies now鈥 It will make a big difference to the United States economically if we could have American oil companies really invest in and produce the oil capabilities in Venezuela.鈥

Washington is dictating opposition strategy, or at least providing input into its formulation. One of the challenges the opposition faces is demonstrating to rank-and-file Venezuelans that the current offensive against Maduro will be different from the disastrous attempts of 2014 and 2017, when anti-government leaders assured protesters that the president would be toppled in a matter of days.

Different?

The opposition leadership claims that this time is different for two reasons. First, the regional right turn has deepened, and the opposition can to rely on decisive support from other governments, regardless of how democratic they are 鈥 see the neofascist credentials of Brazil鈥檚 Jair Bolsonaro.

Second, the opposition is counting on the backing of military officers, particularly lower-ranking ones who have allegedly lost patience with Maduro. As well as some defections, junior officers attempted to just two days before mass opposition protests on January 23 when Guaid贸 declared himself president. Previously, Venezuela鈥檚 opposition expressed some contempt for military officers for failing to defy the Chavista government.

The opposition鈥檚 new perspective dates back to Trump鈥檚 three and his , made alongside President Iv谩n Duque of Colombia last September, that the Maduro government 鈥渃ould be toppled very quickly by the military if the military decides to do that鈥. The US effort to encourage the military to step in was again made evident on February 6 when that US sanctions against senior officers for alleged illegal actions could be lifted 鈥渇or any Venezuelan senior military officer that stands for democracy and recognizes the constitutional government of President Juan Guaid贸鈥.

Recently, Guaid贸 made a similar offer, implying continuity and closeness between Washington and the shadow government.

Guaid贸 and other VP leaders are closer to Washington than the rest of the opposition. The reported that Guaid贸 consulted Mike Pence the night before his self-proclamation as president on January 23. According to ex-presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski, most and did not support the idea.

The VP-led opposition is openly working hand-in-glove with Washington. Guaid贸 recently announced he would attempt to transport the US has deposited on the Colombian and Brazilian borders into Venezuela. He called on the Venezuelan military to disobey orders from the Maduro government by facilitating the passage.

While playing political benefactor, Washington was clearly manipulating the optics of the situation to discredit Maduro and rally more international support for Gua铆do. In an apparent rebuke to Washington and Guaid贸, UN spokesman St茅phane Dujarric on Wednesday insisted that the humanitarian aid be 鈥溾.

Opposition leaders and the Trump administration are also working together to isolate Venezuela economically throughout the world. An opposition leader, Julio Borges, has campaigned to convince international financial institutions to shun Venezuelan transactions. He urged stored in London. Maduro responded by calling on the Attorney-General to open judicial proceedings against Borges for treason.

Similarly, US Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross are trying to convince international business interests to .

Anti-imperialism

The Trump administration鈥檚 blatant interventionism may backfire and help Maduro counter his sagging poll numbers, which last October the polling firm Datan谩lisis reported was 23%. Maduro recently at the close nexus between Washington and the opposition, saying: 鈥淎ren't you embarrassed at yourselves, ashamed at the way every day by Twitter Mike Pence, John Bolton, Mike Pompeo tell you what you should do.鈥

Anti-imperialism is a major cornerstone of the Chavista movement. It was born from resentment of US interventionism and heavy-handedness that had for decades controlled many of Venezuela鈥檚 resources and dictated its policies.

The maneuvers of the Trump administration and its allies only strengthen this narrative, and are counterproductive to best solving the crisis. Their actions also risk fanning anti-American sentiment throughout the continent.

It wouldn鈥檛 be the first time: In 1958, then-vice president Nixon was attacked by a riotous crowd in Caracas. A decade later, Nelson Rockefeller鈥檚 fact-finding tour arranged by then-President Nixon faced off with angry disruptive protests. Both incidents were responses to Washington's self-serving support for undemocratic regimes.

Washington today is invoking not only its Cold War policy but the Monroe Doctrine and its view of Latin America as the US鈥檚 鈥渂ackyard鈥. Indeed, Vice President Pence said to , answering a question about why Trump is withdrawing troops from Syria and Afghanistan while intervening in Venezuela.

鈥淧resident Trump has always had a very different view of our hemisphere,鈥 he said. 鈥淗e鈥檚 long understood that the United States has a special responsibility to support and nurture democracy and freedom in this hemisphere and that鈥檚 a longstanding tradition.鈥

Trump recently appointed neocon Elliott Abrams as special envoy to Venezuela. Abrams has in many ways personified the application of the Monroe Doctrine with his blatant disregard for human rights violation and the principle of non-intervention in Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador in the 1980s. He was allegedly implicated in the 2002 coup against Hugo Ch谩vez.聽聽

Trump鈥檚 decision regarding CITGO, a US-based company owned by Venezuela鈥檚 state-owned PDVSA oil company, speaks to a dangerous precedent. On February 6, he declared that jurisdiction over CITGO would be turned over to the shadow government.聽These sanctions ignore the rule of law. The Maduro government was never given the chance to defend itself and legal procedures were not followed.

It is always dubious at Trump鈥檚 intentions. His actions in Venezuela could be designed to divert attention from the multiple probes into his own unethical behavior, or they may be a way to draw attention away from the utter fiasco of US interventions in the Middle East.

Trump may also view his Venezuela policy as a quick fix to 鈥淢ake America Great Again鈥. Trump also evidently sees the downfall of Maduro as the ultimate proof that socialism doesn鈥檛 work. He indicated as much in his February 5 , where after discussing Venezuela, he declared: 鈥淎merica will never be a socialist country.鈥

Negative outcome

Regardless of short-term results of US support for Guaid贸, the final outcome will be negative, for many reasons. First, it bolsters the position of the opposition鈥檚 most radical elements, thus contributing to the anti-Chavista movement鈥檚 fragmentation.

Second, it attaches a 鈥渕ade in USA鈥 label to those positioned to govern should Maduro fall. The stigma would undoubtedly scuttle their chances of maintaining longstanding majority support. It undermine their authority and ability to govern.

Third, the appeal to the military to save Venezuela has terrifying implications for a continent with a long history of military rule. Finally, seizing Venezuelan assets, which have then been turned over to a political ally, violates sacred norms of property rights, eroding confidence in the system of private property.

These four considerations indicate the multiple adverse impacts the Trump administration鈥檚 rash approach to the Maduro government will have on the US, Venezuela, and the region.

[Steve Ellner is a retired professor from Venezuela鈥檚 University of the East and associate managing editor of Latin American Perspectives.]

You need 一品探花, and we need you!

一品探花 is funded by contributions from readers and supporters. Help us reach our funding target.

Make a One-off Donation or choose from one of our Monthly Donation options.

Become a supporter to get the digital edition for $5 per month or the print edition for $10 per month. One-time payment options are available.

You can also call 1800 634 206 to make a donation or to become a supporter. Thank you.