One of the concerns of First Nations activists in the progressive No camp is that the聽Voice聽will not be truly representative. They have reason for concern.
First Nations activists, including Djab Wurrung Gunnai Gunditjmara聽Senator Lidia Thorpe, have described the聽Voice聽as 鈥渁ppointed鈥 or 鈥渟elf-selected鈥 by its chief architects, including Marcia Langton and Noel Pearson.
The official Yes case is silent on how the聽Voice聽will be selected. It only says that the聽Voice聽will have 鈥渞epresentatives from all states and territories, the Torres Strait Islands and remote communities鈥 and will 鈥渋nclude young people and a balance of men and women鈥.
The Anthony Albanese Labor government says the legislation, yet to be presented to parliament, will contain the details about the聽Voice鈥檚 composition.
The July 2021聽聽of the Indigenous Co-Design Committee, headed by Tom Calma and Langton, expressly recommends that the National聽Voice聽not聽be directly elected by First Nations people. They want it to instead be appointed by 35 regional聽Voice聽assemblies (themselves also not directly elected) and partly appointed in liaison with governments.
Under the system proposed by the Calma-Langton report, it is hard to imagine how First Nations people who are not bureaucratically entrenched at the regional level would be elected to the national聽Voice.
If any grassroots activists somehow get through that hurdle, an 鈥渆thics committee鈥 is then proposed to vet those聽wanting to be appointed to the national Voice.
Being convicted under the draconian anti-protest laws, now in force in all states, might well be grounds for exclusion from the聽Voice.
Further, the Calma-Langton report recommended that the process of setting up regional聽Voice聽structures (which would encompass existing Aboriginal institutions) might take about three years before the first 鈥渋nterim聽Voice鈥 be appointed.
This approach is very different from previous advisory bodies.
First Nations people directly elected two of the previous national advisory bodies 鈥 the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee/National Aboriginal Conference (NACC/NAC) (1973鈥1985) and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) (1990鈥2005).
When these former advisory bodies mustered the confidence, or leadership, to challenge the government of the day, the fact that they were directly elected by First Nations people gave them political authority. Coalition and Labor governments, alike, hated this.
Emeritus Professor Tim Rowse pointed out in his聽聽of the聽Calma-Langton report聽that it聽was shaped by 鈥渃oncessions to conservative opinion鈥.
鈥淭he Final Report addresses conservative caution in several ways: explicitly denying the National聽Voice聽an 鈥榠nquisitorial鈥 role; refusing to propose a model of funding that would insulate the聽Voice聽from the annual budget; plotting a slow implementation plan that requires much intergovernmental cooperation; and subjecting the 35 Local and Regional聽Voices聽to a process of government evaluation before recognition.鈥
Rowse聽said聽the committee聽had聽proposed聽steps to address the conservative fear that the聽Voice聽might have聽too much聽political authority.
鈥淎s Paul Kelly pointed out in several articles in聽The Australian聽in 2018 and 2019, the conservative fear that the National聽Voice聽to Parliament would be a 鈥榯hird chamber鈥 is best understood as a reasoned apprehension of the moral authority of National聽Voice,鈥澛燫owse聽noted.
鈥淭o act contrary to advice issued publicly by the National聽Voice聽could be politically costly for any government.鈥
To address this conservative fear, the Calma-Langton report proposed that parliament and the government would only be expected to 鈥渃onsult on proposed laws and policies that have a significant or distinctive impact on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples鈥.
Further, Rowse said the Calma-Langton report proposed that the聽Voice聽have no right to challenge the decision of the government in a court.
鈥淭he Final Report then goes on to recommend that no court should ever be allowed to rule on whether a government was meeting these obligations and expectations. That is, the 鈥榗onsultation standards鈥 must be non-justiciable,鈥 Rowse explained.
If major concessions to conservative opinion like these were necessary for the聽Voice聽to get up, what will the聽Voice聽be good for? And who will it represent?
[This is the second in a series by Peter Boyle on the Voice. The first part is here.]