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Having doubled the bounty on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to US$50 million, the United States government started announcing the deployment of as many as nine warships throughout the Caribbean in mid-August, including destroyers, amphibious assault ships, a guided-missile cruiser, a nuclear submarine, about 1200 missiles and up to 6500 marines. The pretext is fighting drug cartels, with US Attorney General Pam Bondi accusing Maduro of being “one of the largest narco-traffickers in the world”.

Almost simultaneously, the first two oil tankers chartered by US multinational Chevron since its operations restarted in Venezuela docked in the US on August 21, while two more deportation flights landed in Venezuela days later. The two initiatives are fruits of ongoing negotiations between the Donald Trump and Maduro governments.

What should we make of such contradictory events? How should solidarity activists respond? In the first of a two-part series, һƷ̽��’s Kerry Smith speaks to Federico Fuentes, a regular GL writer on Venezuela and long-time solidarity activist.

What is the justification and scale of the US military deployment?

The first thing to say is this deployment has no justification and must be opposed. History is replete with examples of the US using the “war on drugs” to militarise the region and bully, or even overthrow, governments, as with Panama in 1989. This cannot be allowed to happen again.

The justifications presented are clearly a lie. There is no evidence to back claims alleging Maduro heads up a drug cartel; in fact, the government’s own intelligence refutes this. Its own statistics also reveal that the majority of drugs coming from the south travel via the Pacific, and not through the Caribbean or Atlantic. So, we are dealing with a manufactured pretext for a deployment that has other motives.

As for the scale, this is difficult to ascertain, in part because of the lack of official announcements and media disinformation. For example, the corporate media cited an unnamed US official claiming three destroyers would arrive off Venezuela’s coast by August 20, a claim repeated by pro-Maduro media outlets. But weeks later both Venezuelan and unnamed US officials have acknowledged this is not the case.

All of this casts certain doubt on the exact extent of the deployment. But regardless of its scale, the deployment should be opposed as a threat to peace and sovereignty in the region.

What is the aim of the deployment?

Despite speculation, in current conditions, a full-scale invasion of Venezuela to topple Maduro is extremely unlikely. There are several reasons why.

First, the announced deployment is nowhere near what is required to invade Venezuela. For comparison, the US used about 25,000 troops to invade the much smaller and militarily weaker Panama [in 1989].

Second, the bluster from US officials indicates they are seeking to achieve their aims by applying pressure on Venezuela, rather than open military warfare. 

Third, there is no appetite in the US for a new war, at least outside the more fanatical elements of the right-wing Latin American community in Miami. Trump knows this — that is why he has falsely sought to present himself as the “peace president” who ends wars, not starts them.

None of this rules out the possibility of targeted strikes or small-scale operations, not just against Venezuela but Mexico — which has been targeted by US officials — and other countries. Just weeks ago, Trump reportedly directed the Pentagon to start planning possible military strikes against Latin American cartels.

Another factor to consider is the impact this military deployment will likely have on Venezuela’s trade, in particular oil exports. Trump strongly believes Venezuela’s oil belongs to the US, not China or Russia. When we consider the existing US sanctions, which make trading with Venezuela risky, and add the threat of the deployment, some countries might get cold feet about sending oil tankers into the Caribbean.

And, of course, we cannot account for the unpredictable. Tensions between Venezuela and Guyana have been simmering for some years over a disputed territory on their shared border. A false move there could set off an unpredictable chain of events that could see US warships involved and escalate from there.

These are all further reasons to oppose the US military deployment in the Caribbean. But the evidence suggests that Trump is seeking to ramp up what he and special envoy to Venezuela Richard Grenell have referred to as their strategy of “peace through force”.

What is that?

We have seen this strategy at play before: Trump makes a grandiose threat to make himself look tough, then negotiates certain advantages for the US he can sell at home, before backing down on his threat. This is the approach Trump has pursued with his tariffs. But he has also relied on the threat of military force: earlier this year Trump threatened to “take back” the Panama Canal, leading to the US obtaining important concessions from Panama at China’s expense.

Looking at Venezuela, there are two potential sides to this strategy right now, which are not inherently contradictory but clearly represent competing visions within the Trump government on Venezuela. 

Both wings want Maduro replaced by a more US-friendly government. But for the wing aligned with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio — a traditional Republican anti-Communist hardliner whose support base is among Miami’s right-wing Latin American community — this should be the priority. This wing has actively played up the threat of military action. In turn, Maduro has blamed Rubio, rather than Trump, for the deployment.

The current deployment clearly plays to Rubio’s base and his supporters in the Venezuelan right-wing opposition. They hope it might lead to һƷ̽�� within the military handing Maduro over to save themselves, or terrorist and paramilitary elements of the right-wing opposition launching attacks, believing US marines will follow closely behind.

Are such scenarios likely?

There is no evidence to suggest this, certainly in terms of the government collapsing or the military splitting, though no one can rule out extremist attacks given the right-wing opposition’s long history of such practices.

In reality, the Maduro government is perhaps in the strongest position it has been for quite some time. On one hand, it has been buoyed by an economic recovery that, despite the sanctions, has seen 17 quarters of consecutive growth. For context though, the economy remains nearly three times smaller than it was in 2014, and workers have not benefited — last month the minimum wage dropped below US$1 a month.

On the other hand, the right-wing opposition is weaker and more divided than ever, especially after last year’s July 28 presidential elections. Despite strong evidence suggesting right-wing candidate Edmundo Gonzalez won, and an unprecedented revolt in traditionally pro-Maduro working-class and poor areas against the refusal to publish results validating Maduro’s announced victory, Maduro was sworn in as president without much incident in January.

This was due to the scale of repression after the elections and prior to inauguration, but also because of the right-wing opposition’s failed strategy of relying on the incoming Trump government to do the heavy lifting of removing Maduro, something it has so far refused to do.

So, is Trump’s strategy failing?

Only if you think Trump supports Rubio’s outlook. But while Trump’s strategy benefits from Rubio’s tough talk (“force”), on key decisions he has consistently come down on the opposite side to Rubio, and not just on Chevron’s licence, which Rubio promised would not be renewed.

That brings us to the other wing, represented by Grenell. This wing accepts that, regardless of Maduro’s legitimacy, he heads the only viable government in Venezuela and therefore must be involved in any negotiations. This assessment was behind the first decision that sidelined Rubio, namely not inviting González to Trump’s inauguration, despite recognising him as “president-elect”, and instead sending Grenell to talk directly with Maduro in Caracas.

This wing believes US policy towards Venezuela should prioritise “America first”. Specifically, that means securing access to Venezuela’s oil (while blocking competitors), deporting migrants, reducing the flow of drugs into the US and ensuring the release of US citizens and opening spaces for the opposition so as to create the conditions internally within Venezuela that could lead to Maduro’s removal. 

From this perspective, Trump’s policy has had successes: Caracas agreed to Chevron’s licence, which violates Venezuela’s sovereignty and benefits the US; Maduro accepted deportation flights, having halted them under former US president Joe Biden, and several US citizens have been released.

We will have to see what happens with this deployment, though there are already indications that Trump has obtained further concessions with the release of 13 jailed opposition leaders and Venezuela stepping up its anti-drug operations.  

[Part two of this interview will look at the significance of the reported US Navy strike on an alleged Venezuelan “drug boat”, and the Maduro government’s response to current events.]